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Introduction 
The fine-tuning of our universe’s fundamental laws and constants [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
requires an explanation [2] [7] [8]. For example, it seems that the strength of gravity has 
to be fine-tuned to an accuracy of 1/1036 [4] for life to exist. Depending on the researcher, 
the number of recognized fine-tuning constraints posed by life varies from some tens to a 
hundred. 
A popular way to explain the happy coincidences are the varied multiverse hypotheses. 
Namely, if there are sufficiently many universes, it will not be surprising to find at least 
one universe with fine-tuned constants. Because we cannot observe our own non-
existence, the observer selection effect (OSE) is thought to ‘filter out’ all the universes 
where observers can not exist. Indeed, many have taken the combination of multiverse 
theories with the observer selection effect as sufficient to explain fine-tuning [2] [9] [10]. 
Several inferences in physics have been made using anthropic constraints. Given that 
observers (we) exist, one can use this information and constrain the estimates on physical 
parameters or make predictions about them. This represent inference within a physical 
hypotheses and both the hypothesis and observability are used as background 
information, basically as constraints. This kind of inference should not be confused with 
the goal of the present paper which is inference concerning the overarching hypotheses 
themselves. As will be seen, when comparing hypotheses, the information about 
observability enters the comparison as data, not merely as a constraint.  
 
A good reminder of problems with the use of observer selection effects is given by Leslie 
[2]: A prisoner being executed by a firing squad finds that all of the marksmen have 
missed and against all odds he is alive. The surviving prisoner now notes that one can 
only observe one’s own survival and uses the observer selection effect to infer that his 
survival was just as likely to be due to chance than due to design. There is nothing to 
explain, claims the prisoner. In fact, any ridiculous hypothesis with a nonzero probability 
for survival is an equally good explanation. But this seems intuitively false. 
The above paradox is even more visible when we modify the example a bit. Let us 
consider a case where the prisoner is blindfolded and cannot hear anything. The prisoner 
only knows that he has just survived an execution by a firing squad.  Furthermore, the 
prisoner knows that there are two squads around, one with two marksmen, the other with 
a thousand marksmen. Which firing squad is more probable to have carried out the 
execution? If the prisoner uses the selection effect as advocated e.g. by E. Sober [10], he 
will infer that both squads are equally probable. Again, this kind of inference seems 
intuitively false. It seems that at least in some cases hypotheses which give a low 
probability for the observation (survival) should also be given a low probability in the 
hypothesis comparison.  
 
This paper reviews and evaluates four popular suggestions on how to use the observer 
selection effect in the case of fine-tuning. These are the “assume the observation (AO)” 
approach above by Sober, the “self-sampling assumption (SSA)” approach by Bostrom 
[11], the “some universe (SU)” approach by e.g. Manson and Thrush [12], and the “this 
universe (TU)” approach by e.g. White [13] and Dowe [14]. Among these, mainly the 
SSA has been claimed to be a general theory for selection effects. AO and SSA are 
discussed first and reasons are given for why they are likely to be incorrect. The 
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discussion then proceeds to SU and TU and reasons are given for why cosmic fine-tuning 
seems to be a TU case.  
The main argument in this paper concerns the proper use of the probabilities. The precise 
shape of the probability distributions or the numerical values are not central to the 
argument. The argument remains essentially the same for all reasonable distributions. 
Ways of estimating some of the underlying distributions exist [15], but uniform 
probabilities are used here for clarity. Although some shortcuts would be available, the 
equations are mostly written down in detail because in my opinion in the end this is the 
clearest way of carrying out the inference.  
 
Principles of Bayesian hypothesis comparison 
In this section the basic equations for Bayesian hypothesis testing are reviewed. Readers 
familiar with Bayesian methods may want to skip this section.  
Probabilities will be used in the epistemic sense, denoting plausibilities first and 
frequencies of occurrence only as a result [16] [17]. It is to be understood that all 
probabilities are conditional on some background information I . I  will mostly be 
shown explicitly in the equations as this may help the reader to see the difference 
between its use and the use of other propositions in the calculation. 
Bayes’ theorem can be derived from the product rule of probability, which states that the 
probability for A  and B  can be written as 
 
 
( ) ( | ) ( )p A B p A B p B∧ = , (1) 
 
where by A B∧  we mean a logical conjunction ( A  and B  are true) and  ( | )p A B  
denotes a conditional probability of A  being true given that B is true. Alternatively one 
can also write 
 
 ( ) ( | ) ( )p A B p B A p A∧ = . (2)  
 
Equating the right sides of eqs. (1) and (2) one obtains the Bayes’ theorem 
 
 
( ) ( | )( | ) ( )
p B p A Bp B A
p A
= . (3) 
 
Eq. (3) is a general tool for probabilistic inversion; If the probability of A  given B , 
( | )p A B , is known, we can calculate the probability of B  given A , ( | )p B A . However, 
this presupposes that we can estimate ( )p B  and ( )p A , the prior probabilities of B  and 
A .  
Let us assume that , 1,...,iC i n=  are a complete set of propositions. The law of total 
probability states 
 
 
( ) ( )i
i
p A p A C= ∧∑ . (4) 
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Hence, if we have the joint probability density for A  and iC , we can sum over all the 
possible iC  to get the probability for A . This process of eliminating propositions by 
summing is called marginalization. 
Let nH be some hypothesis and D  some measured data. Bayes’ theorem (eq. (3)) gives 
the probability of the hypothesis nH  given the data D  
 
 
( | ) ( | )( | ) ( | )
n n
n
p H I p D H Ip H D I
p D I
∧
∧ = , (5) 
 
where ( | )np D H I∧  is the probability of the data for the hypothesis nH (often called the 
likelihood) and ( | )np H I  is the prior probability of nH . The term ( | )p D I  is often called 
a marginal probability and can be viewed as just a normalization constant common to all 
hypotheses. 
Using eq. (5), we can compare the probabilities of several hypotheses by using the ratio 
of their probabilities given the data 
 
 
( | ) ( | ) ( | )
( | ) ( | ) ( | )
n n n
m m m
p H D I p H I p D H I
p H D I p H I p D H I
∧ ∧
=
∧ ∧
, (6) 
 
where on the right side the first term is the ratio of the prior probabilities of the 
hypotheses. The second term is the ratio of probabilities for the measured data D under 
each hypothesis. It is therefore a ratio of each model’s prediction of the data D.  
In order to clarify the use of the above equation, Figure 1. depicts the predictions of two 
hypotheses for the variable E . It is important to note that probability distributions are 
normalized so that the total probability, which is a sum or an integral over all possible 
values, equals one. In the figure, hypothesis 1H  gives a rather broad prediction and due 
to normalization, the prediction is low overall. Hypothesis 2H  gives a rather strict 
prediction for E  near to the value 2 and the distribution is high in this area. Now, if we 
measure 2E = , 1( 2 |  )p E H I= ∧  has a moderate value but 2( 2 | & )p E H I= is large. 
From eq. (6) we get 1
2
( | 2 ) 0.35 1( | 2 ) 1.6
p H E I
p H E I
= ∧
=
= ∧
  and hence hypothesis 2H  is more 
probable given the data. However, if we measure 3E = , which does not hit the high peak 
of  2H , 1
2
( | 3 ) 0.35 1( | 3 ) 0.001
p H E I
p H E I
= ∧
=
= ∧
  and hence hypothesis 1H  is more probable. It is 
seen that because of the normalization, hypotheses are penalized for making broad 
predictions. They give a moderate probability for many possible values but cannot predict 
anything well. 
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Figure 1. Two hypotheses H1 and H2 have a prediction concerning the value of E. Due to 
normalization of the probability density, a hypothesis with a broad prediction does not predict 
anything very well. 
 
In addition to the above equations, some tools for handling the conditional independence 
of statements, originally discovered in the field of Bayesian belief networks, will be used. 
They will be introduced below. 
 
Nomenclature 
The following symbols will be used frequently, the reader may wish to skim casually 
through them for now and refer back to the definitions in detail later if necessary: 
 nH  The proposition that hypothesis  nH is true. 
M  Multiverse hypothesis in particular 
Ω   The set conceivable values for the vector of physical constants 
E   A vector of the coordinate variables of corresponding to the physical constants 
and parameters.  
D  Our present data (concerning a realization of E), D ↔ ”E = the present physical 
constants  and parameters.”  
Later in the paper we will need to distinguish between “this universe is fine-tuned” and 
“some universe is fine-tuned”. For this reason the following two are introduced: 
tD  This universe is fine-tuned.  The index t  represents the ‘true index’ of our 
universe. 
'D  Some universe is fine-tuned 
And we will also be using the following: 
,
 E nΩ  A set of all possible values for E, given hypothesis  nH  
,
 O nΩ  A set of all values of E that can be observed given hypothesis  nH  
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OΩ  A set of a all values of E that can be observed, an union of all ,O nΩ , 
,O O n
n
Ω ↔ Ω∪  
O  A proposition “The realization of E can be observed”, 
,
( )n O n
n
O H E↔ ∧ ∈Ω∪  
S( Ω )  The size (cardinality) of Ω
 
 
For clarity, we will call a universe inside a multiverse a subverse. Our universe, which is 
possibly one subverse, will be called ourverse.  
 
Assume the observation (AO) 
E. Sober [10] and Ikeda and Jefferys [18] have argued that because one cannot observe 
one’s own non-existence, the observability O should be taken as background information 
for hypothesis comparison. If this is the case, using the Bayes’ theorem to obtain the 
probability of hypothesis 
nH  given the fine-tuning data D , one would get 
 
 
,
,
( | )  ( | ) ( | ) / ( | )
 ( | )
 ( | )
1
,( )
n n n
n
n O n
O n
p H D O I p H I p D H O I p D I
p D H O I
p D H E I
S
∧ ∧ = ∧ ∧
∝ ∧ ∧
= ∧ ∈Ω ∧
≈
Ω
 (7) 
 
where we have neglected ( | )np H I , the prior probability for the hypothesis, and ( | )p D I
, the marginal probability in the second line. The prior and marginal probabilities are 
roughly the same for all hypothesis and will roughly cancel out when 
nH  is compared to 
other hypotheses. The remaining term ( | )np D H O I∧ ∧  is the prediction of the 
hypothesis for the data D . The important thing to note in the above result is that O  is 
used as a condition for the probabilities in the same way as the background information 
I  is. This filters out all unobservable events and is equivalent to assuming that all 
hypotheses will only produce observable events. The prediction of fine-tuning for each 
hypothesis is therefore improved to certainty in the AO approach. This is a bit like asking 
for the probability of a six in a dice throw knowing that you will get a six. Hence, 
assuming AO and taking a uniform prediction for the cosmic constants in the last line of 
eq. (7), the probability of a hypothesis in the comparison is only dependent on the size of 
the observation-space. 
Note that usually in Bayesian hypothesis comparison hypotheses are penalized for 
making broad predictions because the prediction is a normalized probability distribution. 
Yet, on AO, the non-observable part of the prediction is filtered out and the hypotheses 
are not penalized for predicting however broadly in the event-space.  
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Weisberg [19] has noted that our information in the case of observer selection effects is 
actually of the form ”If we observe, we will observe O ” not ”we will observe O ”, as AO 
assumes. So, we really have only the conditional " "D O→  as background information. 
Weisberg shows that this information does not raise the prediction for fine-tuning. 
Already the above argument seems enough to discredit AO but we will nevertheless press 
on to facilitate further understanding on the topic by using some of the mathematics 
developed for inference with Bayesian belief networks [20] [21]. In general, the 
probability for the hypothesis given the relevant information will depend on the joint 
probability, as can be seen from the definition of conditional probability 
 
 ( | )  ( ) / ( ).n np H D O I p D O H I p D O I∧ ∧ = ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧  (8) 
 
Now, the joint probability will in general factor as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | )n n n np D O H I p I p H I p O H I p D O H I∧ ∧ ∧ = ∧ ∧ ∧ .  (9) 
 
Only in the case that the observation O  and the hypothesis nH  are independent, 
|nO H⊥ ∅  (or |nO H I⊥ ) [20] [21], does one get 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | )
( ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | )
( | ) ( | ),
n n n n
n n
n n
p D O H I p I p H I p O H I p D O H I
p I p H I p O I p D O H I
p H I p D O H I
∧ ∧ ∧ = ∧ ∧ ∧
= ∧ ∧
∝ ∧ ∧
 (10) 
 
which, when used in eq. (8), is the AO method. In the last line we show only the terms 
dependent on the hypothesis and hence relevant for hypothesis comparison. Hence, a 
necessary and sufficient condition for Sober’s method is the independence of the 
observation from the hypothesis. Figure 1a shows the necessary probabilistic dependency 
structure as a graph [22] [23].  
In the case of cosmic fine-tuning, the probability of observation is not independent of the 
hypothesis but instead the observation is a probabilistic product of the hypothesis, and 
one has to use eq. (9). The case corresponds to the graph in Figure 1b. Hence, in the case 
of cosmic fine-tuning, probability theory requires one to use also the prediction for the 
observation, ( | )np O H I∧ , in the hypothesis comparison. It’s use is also required by the 
strong condition to use all available information. As a result, hypotheses purporting to 
explain fine-tuning must be penalized for having a low prediction for observability. So, 
when one has survived a very dangerous accident, the capability to observe ones own 
survival cannot be taken as background information, thereby assuming that the survival 
was certain, but as part of the data. Hypotheses must be favored according to how high a 
probability they give for the survival and the corresponding observation. The conditional 
statement " "D O→
 
by Weisberg can legitimately be taken as background information 
but this does not raise the prediction for fine-tuning. 
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Figure 2. a) When the observation O  is independent of the hypothesis nH  conditional on the data 
D , the observation cannot be used as data in the hypothesis comparison, resulting in a result 
equivalent to the assume the observation (AO) approach. b) In the case of cosmic fine-tuning the 
observation is a product of the hypothesis and hence O  has to be used as data in the hypothesis 
comparison. It follows that the AO approach is incorrect for cosmic fine-tuning. 
 
The self-sampling assumption (SSA) 
Interesting work has been done by N. Bostrom [11] on developing a theory of how to 
take selection effects into account, along with a good explanation of the issues involved. 
Bostrom’s suggestion for inference in cases involving selection effects is the self-
sampling assumption (SSA), which states that one should reason as if one were a random 
sample from the set of all observers in one’s own reference class. The exact definition of 
‘one’s own reference class’ remains open, leaving room for movement under criticism 
[24]. Bostrom has developed a modified version of SSA, called the observation equation 
or SSSA-R (from Strong SSA Revised), which mainly corrects for SSA’s bias to select 
hypotheses with big amounts of observers. SSA was developed inductively from 
examples and from attempted solutions to some encountered paradoxes. This makes the 
method somewhat ad-hoc. It is based on intuitive solutions, which may or may not be 
truly correct solutions, to thought-experiments, which may or may not be analogous to 
fine-tuning. I my opinion SSSA-R and variants try to give directly something that should 
be the result of rigorous probabilistic inference. 
Leslie has argued that SSA leads to observer-relative chances [25]. Bostrom has admitted 
that it does [26], but does not think that this poses a problem. Yet it does seem 
problematic that, even if two observers exchange information so that they have the same 
information except that the one has ‘I am A, he is B’ and the other has ‘I am B, he is A’, 
they will not arrive at the same probabilities with SSA. If they start gambling, both 
cannot win. Moreover, in principle the observers could ‘rise above’ their circumstances 
and, like we, calculate the probability that the other would use and hence both of them 
will obtain two contradictory probabilities for the case. A further question is, what 
probability should we use as outsiders, and why should the observers involved not use 
that probability also? To me it does not seem rational that the probability will change just 
because of the identity of the person doing the inference. Indeed, this is contrary to the 
starting assumptions of some derivations of probability theory [16] which may lead to 
contradictions in SSA since probability theory was used in the derivation of SSA and 
because SSA purports to give out probabilities. 
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We will now show that, in addition to the above problems, SSSA-R can lead to 
probabilities bigger than one. We will use Bostrom’s God’s Coin Toss (GC) example in 
reference [11] and modify it a bit: A coin is thrown. If the coin lands heads (H), a world 
with an amount hβ  of black bearded and hα  red bearded observers is created. If the coin 
lands tails (T), a world with tβ  black bearded and zero red bearded observers is created. 
Let ( ) ( ) 1/ 2p H p T= =  and let Dβ  represent the evidence available to the observer who 
has discovered that he has a black beard. Now, with Bostrom’s own usage of SSSA-R 
(the original approach where all observers are in the same reference class), we get 
 
 
1
1 1 1( | )p H D
h h t h hβ α β β α β
−
 
= +  + + 
. (11) 
 
and 
 
 
1
1 1 1( | )p T D
h h t tβ α β β β
−
 
= +  + 
. (12) 
 
But a problem becomes apparent when we calculate 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( )p T p T D p T D p T D p T D p Dβ β β β β= ∧ + ∧ ¬ = ∧ = , (13) 
 
and hence 
 
 
( )( ) ( | )
p Tp D
p T Dβ β
= . (14) 
 
Now because ( ) 1/ 2p T =  and ( | )p T Dβ  can be arbitrarily small, SSSA-R can lead to 
arbitrarily large values for ( )p Dβ . For example, taking 2h hβ α= =  and 10tβ = , we get 
1/ 2 7( )
2 / 7 4
p Dβ = = . But by definition a probability cannot be bigger than one. A similar 
result can be obtained for SSA. Hence, SSA and variants are inconsistent with probability 
theory. 
 
This universe (TU) or some universe (SU)? 
We will now turn our attention on whether one should really use tD ⇔ “this universe is 
fine-tuned” (TU) or 'D ⇔ =“some universe is fine-tuned” (SU) as data. Of course, this 
choice has profound implications on the inference concerning fine-tuning because in a 
sufficiently large multiverse it is virtually certain that some subverse will be fine-tuned. 
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White has argued for the use of TU as data in the fine-tuning case [13]. White points out 
that some-propositions are weaker and contain less information than corresponding this-
propositions. Hence, White argues that because the some-proposition 'D contains less 
information than the this-proposition tD , which we have available, tD   should not be 
replaced with 'D  because doing so would violate the strong desiderata to use all 
available information. So, when a this-proposition is available as data, the use of the 
corresponding some-proposition is warranted if and only if it leads to the same 
conclusion as using the this-proposition. We will first try to answer the main criticisms of 
TU and then show why cosmic fine-tuning is indeed a TU case. 
Manson and Thrush argue against the use of TU on the basis that those arguing for TU do 
not seem to use “this planet” (TP) as data [12]. This criticism is dependent on two 
assumptions:  
(1) We should not use TP as data. 
(2) Subverses and planets are equivalent as concerns the inference.   
Consider a simple case where we did not have any observations of the other planets. Let 
us also say we had two hypotheses about solar system formation. The good hypothesis 1H  
would predict the observed properties of the earth and the sun with good accuracy and the 
bad hypothesis 2H  would give a near-zero prediction for the data. Science normally 
proceeds by selecting the hypothesis which better explains the phenomena, in this case 
1H . Yet, if we were to use “some planet is such and such” (SP) as data, even the bad 
hypothesis would predict that the data will be observed somewhere with a probability of 
one when there is an infine amount of planets. The two hypotheses would remain equal. 
It therefore seems that the past, present, and future success of astrophysics depends on 
our steering clear of SP. 
Second, there is a difference in inference concerning planets and universes: we can 
observe other planets but not other subverses. So, for planetary formation, our data 
consists also of the other observed planets and hypotheses are compared based on all of 
the planets. In the case of the multiverse, we do not have data on the other universes and 
therefore our inference will be based only on this universe. As will be shown below, this 
difference is important when considering whether one should use this- or some-type 
propositions. Hence, subverses and planets are not analogous for the present discussion. 
Bostrom’s analysis of fine-tuning also uses SU. Bostrom argues against TU [11] first by 
pointing out that White’s approach is committed to ( | ' ) ( | ')ip M D D p M D∧ <  for every 
subverse i t≠ . The above means that the probability for a multiverse is smaller when TU 
is used as data than when SU is used as data. So far so good, but next Bostrom 
misinterprets the inequality to mean that any finely tuned universe other than ourverse 
would make M  more likely, which he then sees as a problem for TU. But what makes 
( | ')p M D  bigger is not the state of any particular universe but instead the relaxation of 
the information that we have about the particular universe. A small modification of 
White’s coffee table example [13] shows that this is a natural inequality resulting from 
the difference between ‘some’ and ‘this’: The information that someone at the coffee 
table was drunk last night increases the probability for there being several persons at the 
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table. Yet the use the information that in fact the person who was drunk last night was 
John cancels the increase of probability for there being several people at the table.  
Second, Bostrom tries to prove wrong White’s assertion that a multiverse does not predict 
fine-tuning for this universe any better than a single universe by pointing out that there 
may be correlations among subverses. Bostrom seems to shift the burden of proof to 
White, claiming that unless it is proved that a multiverse cannot gain a better prediction 
for fine-tuning due to correlations, a multiverse is a good explanation. But possible 
correlations to other subverses cannot improve a multiverse’s prediction for fine-tuning 
because we do not possess relevant information about the other possible subverses. 
Neither do we have sufficient knowledge about the correlation function. Using epistemic 
probabilities we can marginalize over our ignorance and as the sum is taken over the 
possible states of the other subverses, the prediction about ourverse will of course iron 
out irrespective of the correlations. And marginalization over the possible correlation 
functions would have the same effect. Hence, correlations among the subverses do not 
help the multiverse.  
Third, Bostrom goes on to claim that White is committed to denying the above-
mentioned inequality ( | ' ) ( | ')ip M D D p M D∧ <  because, in Bostrom’s view, 'D  can 
not be relevant to M  unless information about one subverse x  can be probabilistically 
relevant to another subverse y . But this is clearly wrong. Even if the events of a 
hypothesis are independent, compound information about the events can be very relevant. 
It is hard to think of a case where this would not hold. It seems that while White’s view is 
not committed to paradoxes, Bostrom’s criticism is, for, were Bostrom’s criticism of TU 
true, we would all be forced to use “some” in almost every inference, and as a result 
would be committing the gambler’s fallacy perpetually. It seems that none of the 
criticisms of TU carry much weight. 
In addition to reasons given by White, other points can be made in support of TU: 
• We do seem to live in this universe. Our uncertainty about ourverse concerns the 
‘true index’ or ‘true label’ of ourverse, not the ourverse itself. 
• The use of TU is needed if one wants to make any inference in a large multiverse. 
This is because, in a sufficiently large multiverse, almost everything happens 
somewhere. It is curious that multiverse hypotheses have been used rather 
exclusively as explanations for fine-tuning. Using SU would lead to the 
predictions of almost all theories being very nearly unity for almost all 
conceivable data. This would end scientific inference. 
• A TU analysis will not change drastically should we discover the true index or 
true ‘name’ of ourverse. Yet this information seems to be purely indexical since 
for the present purposes we already know that the index is something (call it t ). 
• A TU analysis seems to minimize the expectation value of observers being wrong. 
To summarize, there are good arguments for using TU, no good reasons against it, and 
good reasons against SU. This seems sufficient to establish the use of TU for cosmic fine-
tuning. Yet, one can further advance the point by considering more carefully the available 
information. 
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TU and the converse conditional 
Presently we know that we live in this universe but we do not know the true index or the 
‘name’ of ourverse. Is this a problem for TU? Note that if we do not know the true index 
of the ourverse, it follows that we do not know the true index of anything within it. For 
example, for any given dice throw in the ourverse there may be corresponding dice 
throws in other subverses. If the correct inference would be to use ‘some event in the 
multiverse’ in these cases, no inference could be done. Clearly, probability theory works 
mostly fine when we use “this”, so we can expect that our not knowing the true index of 
ourverse will not be a problem for TU. Let us now look at how the unknown true index 
can result in “this” or “some”, depending on the case at hand. 
As before, let tD  be the proposition that this universe is finely tuned for life and let also 
t  be a variable for the true index of ourverse. Let the number of subverses be N . It is 
important to note that what is uncertain here is the indexing or naming, not the subverse 
itself. That is, the observed fine-tuning will not move to another subverse because of a 
change in our knowledge, just the indexing we are using may move. Now, because we do 
not know the value of t , we will express our ignorance by marginalizing (summing) over 
it: 
 
 
1 1
1 1
1
( ( ) | ) ( ( ) | )
( | ) ( | ) ( | )
1( | ) ( | ).
N N
t t
i i
N N
t t t
i i
N
t t
i
p t i D H p t i D H
p t i D H p D H p t i D H
p D H p D H
N
= =
= =
=
= ∧ = = ∧
= = ∧ = = ∧
= =
∑ ∑
∑
∪ ∪
 (15) 
 
The above result is equivalent to TU. Note that our knowledge about tD  does not affect 
the probability about the true index of ourverse. For all we know, ourverse’s index could 
be any index and hence the principle of indifference suggests a uniform prior for
( | )tp t i D H= ∧ . It follows that because cosmic fine-tuning is a TU case, a multiverse 
does not predict fine-tuning any better than a single universe and conversely fine-tuning 
does not support a multiverse. 
White points out that what makes the difference between “this” and “some” seems to be 
what White calls the converse observational selection effect [13]. This refers to whether 
any event happening entails our observing it, e.g. whether, using the notation above, 
iD t i→ =  is true. We will denote this conditional by ' 'c iS D t i↔ → = . Of course, in the 
case of cosmic fine-tuning, we will not observe every universe that is fine-tuned, instead 
we observe ourverse only. Hence 
cS  does not hold for cosmic fine-tuning. However, in 
cases where the converse conditional 
cS is true and we observe one tD  , we will typically 
get 
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which is a “some”-type result. It can also be shown that in the more general case where 
we observe m  events and given that we would observe all events for which Dα  is true 
(converse condition), the likelihood will be of the form 
 
 
!( | ) ( | ) ( )! !
m N m Np D H p D H
N m mα α
−
¬
−
, (17) 
 
which clearly is a “some”-type result. Hence, the above clarifies why the converse 
conditional leads to “some” and why, when the converse conditional does not hold, as is 
the case with cosmic fine-tuning, the correct approach is “this” analysis. As an example, 
a fisherman fishing with a fishnet and capable of seeing all the fish couth should use a 
“some”-type analysis like the one in eq. (17). Yet a fish, if it cannot see other fish, should 
use a “this” analysis like the one in eq. (15). The thing which makes the difference is 
information the observer has, not the identity. 
 
Conclusions 
The four most viable approaches for inference in a possible multiverse and in the 
presence of an observer selection effect were reviewed.  
Concerning the ‘assume the observation’ (AO) approach advocated by Sober, Ikeda, and 
Jefferys, it was shown that this kind of an observer selection effect is justified if and only 
if the observation is conditionally independent of the hypothesis. In the case of cosmic 
fine-tuning the observation would be a child of the hypothesis and the two are not 
independent. It follows that one should use the observation as data and not as a 
background condition. Hence, the AO approach for cosmic fine-tuning is incorrect.  
The self-sampling assumption approach by Bostrom was shown to be inconsistent with 
probability theory.  
Several reasons were then given for favoring the ‘this universe’ (TU) approach and main 
criticisms against TU were answered. A formal argument for TU was given based on our 
present knowledge. The main result is that even under a multiverse we should use the 
proposition “this universe is fine-tuned” as data, even if we do not know the ‘true index’ 
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of our universe. It follows that because multiverse hypotheses do not predict fine-tuning 
for this particular universe any better than a single universe hypothesis, multiverse 
hypotheses are not adequate explanations for fine-tuning. Conversely, our data on cosmic 
fine-tuning does not lend support to the multiverse hypotheses. For physics in general, 
irrespective of whether there really is a multiverse or not, the common-sense result of the 
above discussion is that we should prefer those theories which best predict (for this or 
any universe) the phenomena we observe in our universe. 
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